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Abstract. This paper discusses a liquidity run model where investors optimally de-
cide whether or not to acquire private information. This endogenizes the dichotomy
“private information/no private information”. The price of the information makes
the equilibrium partitioning of the fundamentals two dimensional. For intermedi-
ate fundamentals multiplicity can be eliminated by the private information that
investors can have. The dichotomy represents the information structures for low
and high prices respectively. However, it presents a distorted view for intermediate
prices and fundamentals for which unique equilibria without private information
can occur. These results are preserved if the quality of the information is endoge-
nized.
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Investors have incentives to be well-informed when they choose their portfolios. However, the
actual quality of their information is also determined by its price. Liquidity run models after
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Morris and Shin (2000), henceforth referred to as DD and
MS respectively, take the information structure as given.
1 In DD models, investors do not have
private information and can only base their decision whether to remain or withdraw on a common
prior for the fundamentals of the investment. In MS models, investors can also base their
decision on private information about these fundamentals, albeit incomplete. This diﬀerence in
information structure has considerable implications for the equilibria. In DD models without
private information there are two possible symmetric equilibria: all investors either remain or
withdraw. Although for very good or very bad priors there is a unique equilibrium, multiplicity
occurs for intermediate priors. In MS models with private information there is always a unique
equilibrium if the private information is suﬃciently precise. In this equilibrium investors with
good private information remain while investors with bad information withdraw.
This paper presents a liquidity run model where private information acquisition is endogenous.
Investors optimally decide whether to acquire private information taking its price as given. A
trade-oﬀ between the price of information and its expected added value in terms of the investment
return decides whether or not information is acquired. The price can be seen as monetary
costs when the investors hire an investment agency or as a cost in terms of eﬀort and time
when they search for information themselves. The prior for the fundamentals together with the
price of information determines whether in equilibrium investors acquire private information,
which in turn determines the occurrence and extent of the liquidity run. We thereby address a
comment on MS models raised by Rey (2000) that “costly and voluntary information acquisition
should ideally be related to the other fundamentals of the economy.” Hence, in addition to
fundamental causes and self-fulﬁlling prophecies, we introduce the availability and quality of
private information, or more general transparency, as an explanting factor for liquidity runs.
Although the ways in which liquidity runs occur in DD and MS models appear to be very
diﬀerent, both can arise in our model. When the price of information is very high, investors
do not acquire information and we arrive in the DD world. When on contrary the price is
very low, investors will always ﬁnd it attractive to acquire information and we are in the MS
world. For intermediate prices, the two worlds are blended which gives rise to a variety of
possible equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy “private information/no private information”
thus presents a misleading simpliﬁcation. The existence of an equilibrium for all prices and
priors follows from complementarities in information acquisition. When investors base their
decisions on private information, uncertainty about the investment return is increased, which
makes private information more valuable.
1We will interpret these models in a setting where investors have to decide whether or not to withdraw their
money from a certain investment. Alternatively, we could have phrased our paper in terms of investors that
have to decide on rolling-over the debt of a country. More general interpretations of the underlying coordination
problem are possible as well.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 3
Interestingly, even when the prior for the fundamentals is in the intermediate range for which
multiplicity occurs in DD models, there can be a unique equilibrium in our model. Morris and
Shin (2000) introduced private information to construct a hybrid equilibrium in which some
investors remain and others withdraw to eliminate this DD multiplicity. This paper provides a
two dimensional equilibrium partitioning of priors and prices in which each of the three equilibria
can be unique for intermediate priors.
The main consequence of endogenous information acquisition is that the equilibria of the
models with a ﬁxed information structure are not necessarily equilibria in our model. The en-
dogenous information acquisition eliminates a DD equilibrium in which the value of information
is higher than its price. The MS equilibrium instead is eliminated if the value of information is
lower than its price. For intermediate prices, the equilibrium where all investors remain without
information is eliminated when the fundamentals are expected to be intermediate but on the bad
side. The reason for this is that although the expected return is positive, there is a substantial
probability that the realization of the fundamentals is such that the return is negative. This
implies that information about the fundamentals is higher than its price. Likewise, when the
fundamentals are expected to be intermediate but on the good side, the equilibrium where all
investors withdraw without information is eliminated. The equilibrium where investors acquire
information only exists when there is a high uncertainty about the sign of the return. This
is the case for intermediate priors. This shows that for example in case of intermediate prices
and intermediate but relatively bad priors for the fundamentals, there is a unique equilibrium
in which all investors withdraw without information. Hence, the multiplicity that occurs for
intermediate priors in DD models does not necessarily occur in our model. Even for these pri-
ors, an equilibrium without private information can be unique. Note that the multiplicity is not
eliminated by imposing private information. The multiplicity can be eliminated by the private
information that investors can have.
The equilibrium analysis shows that an increase in the precision of the private information
or a decrease in its price have a similar eﬀect on the information acquisition. Second, it shows
that if bad fundamentals are likely, cheap information with a high precision (deﬁning features of
transparency) favors information acquisition and thereby helps to deter a liquidity run. When
good fundamentals are likely, information acquisition is also favored but this leads to more
withdrawing investors. Third, a high volatility favors information acquisition since the high
uncertainty makes private information valuable. The eﬀect on the run depends on whether the
prior for the fundamentals is good or bad.
In Section 1 we discuss the basic model where the precision of the information is ﬁxed and
investors only have to decide whether or not to acquire information. A detailed analysis of the
value of information and the equilibria is given in Section 2. In Section 3 we then discuss an
extension of the model where investors can choose the precision of their information. The price
of information is increasing in its precision which ensures that there is still a trade-oﬀ between
the cost of a better precision and the added value. The results of the extended model and theLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 4
basic model are similar, if not strengthened. Section 4 discuss related literature and Section 5
concludes. The analysis of non-symmetric equilibria is deferred to Appendix A and proofs to
Appendix B.
1. Model
There is a continuum of identical investors with total measure equal to 1. The utility function
of the investors is simply a linear function of their money holdings. In period 0, all investors
have put one unit in the same investment project. In period 1, investors receive new common
information about the investment return that replaces any previous information and that causes
investors to reconsider their investment. In this period they then simultaneously decide whether
to remain invested or to withdraw the money. Investors who withdraw will be fully refunded.
They can then use the money for a risk-free investment alternative with a normalized (net)
return of 0 in the next period. Investors who remain invested until period 2 receive a (net)
return of θ − `, where θ is a random variable summarizing the fundamentals of the investment
project and ` ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of investors who withdrew in period 1.2 The idea is that
if investors withdraw, the project has to be downsized, which negatively aﬀects the return of
the remaining investors. Hence, the return function combines the fundamentals and the cost of
premature liquidation. We assume that the fundamental θ is normally distributed with ex ante
expectation ˆ θ ∈ R and precision α > 0. These parameters are provided to the public only at the
beginning of period 1.3
Before making the investment decision in period 1, but after learning ˆ θ and α, investors can
acquire private noisy information about the realization θ of the fundamental. This informa-
tion helps to discriminate between good and bad realizations of the fundamental. Hence, by
conditioning the investment decision on the information, an investor can remain invested if the
fundamental is likely to be good, while she can leave otherwise. Since in expectation this will
increase her return, the information is valuable.
Investors decide simultaneously whether or not to acquire noisy information. Since we want
to analyze the eﬀect of the price of the information, we let this price be exogenously determined.
The price can be seen as a purely monetary cost of the information, but it may also reﬂect the
eﬀorts needed to collect the information. By focusing on noisy information instead of complete
information, we want to capture the idea that diﬀerent investors combine information from
various noisy sources which leads to diﬀerent private information. When investor i acquires
information, she receives a realization of xi = θ+εi. The noise εi is independent across investors
and distributed according to a normal distribution with zero mean and precision β > 0. In this
section we assume that β is ﬁxed, identical for all investors and public knowledge. In Section 3
we discuss the model where investors can acquire information with any precision. We assume
2For the sake of clarity we do not truncate the return in case θ − ` < −1. This is not essential for the results.
3An alternative interpretation is that the fundamental has an improper uniform distribution over the real line.
For a realization θ and normally distributed noise ε with zero mean and precision α, ˆ θ = θ + ε then represents
imperfect public information about the realization θ.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 5
that an investor does not know the information decisions of other investors when she makes her
investment decision.4
Throughout the paper we will focus on symmetric equilibria, but in Appendix A we will
discuss non-symmetric equilibria. For explanatory convenience we use the following rule when
there is a mass zero of indiﬀerent investors: an investor invests if she is indiﬀerent between
remaining and withdrawing and she acquires information if she is indiﬀerent between acquiring
and not acquiring. This is not essential for the results.
In case all investors decide not to acquire information, they have no means of coordination
and we are in the Diamond-Dybvig world. Denote the two symmetric strategy proﬁles “no-
information/all-remain” and “no-information/all-withdraw” by R and W respectively. Whether
these proﬁles are equilibria depends on the value and the price of information.
In case all investors acquire information, we are in the Morris-Shin world. Whether an investor
remains or withdraws depends on her private information. The related equilibrium candidate
is characterized by a common switching point x∗ such that investor i withdraws if and only if
xi < x∗, so if her information is worse than the switching point x∗.5 An investor who receives
the switching point as private information expects that the return of remaining invested is 0, so
E[θ−`|x∗] = 0. For γMS = α2
β
α+β
α+2β, it is shown in Morris and Shin (2000) that there is a unique
switching point if γMS < 2π. Denote an equilibrium candidate “information/switching-point-x∗”
by I.
In this section we derive detailed expressions for the maximum price investors are willing to pay
for information. In the next section we will use these maximum prices to relate the equilibria with
the ex ante expectation of the fundamental. We ﬁrst introduce some notation and analyze the
information structure in more detail. For given private information and candidate equilibrium,
let the function v : ∅∪R×{I,R,W} → R denote the expected value of the investment opportunity
for an investor who reacts optimally to the strategies of the other investors. We thus loosely
interpret the proﬁles I, R and W as prescribing the strategies of all investors but one. For
Q ∈ {I,R,W} the function v is then deﬁned as
v(∅,Q) = max{0,E[θ − `|Q]}, (1)
v(xi,Q) = max{0,E[θ − `|xi,Q]}. (2)
Note that v is bounded, since E[|X|] is bounded when X has a normal distribution. We will
denote information of which the value is not yet known with a capital letter, so the random
variable Xi denotes the yet unknown information of investor i. Since she does not know the
realization of the fundamental, for her the information Xi has a normal distribution with mean
ˆ θ and precision 1
1/α+1/β =
αβ
α+β. Conversely, Bayesian updating shows that the density of θ
4Assuming that these information decisions are known would not change the equilibrium analysis of Section
2. It would, however, introduce new non-symmetric equilibria.
5The model is thus a global game, see Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2002).LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 6
conditional on the information xi is proportional to
e
−1










So, θ|xi, the fundamental conditional on information xi, has a normal distribution with mean
αˆ θ+βxi
α+β and precision α + β.
Now consider the two Diamond-Dybvig candidate equilibria. The return in the R proﬁle
where all investors remain equals the ex ante expectation of the fundamental ˆ θ. In the original
model investors do not have the possibility of acquiring information. The R proﬁle is then
an equilibrium if remaining gives a (weakly) higher return than withdrawing, so if and only if
ˆ θ ≥ 0. Likewise, the W proﬁle where all investors withdraw is an equilibrium only for ˆ θ ≤ 1
since the expected return equals ˆ θ−1. Note especially that when the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental is in the interval [0,1] both proﬁles are equilibria. In our model, investors do have
the possibility to acquire information. Since this might be a proﬁtable deviation, equilibria in
the original model are not necessarily equilibria in our model. In order to determine whether a
proﬁle is an equilibrium, we need to confront the value of information with its price.
We ﬁrst analyze the R proﬁle where all investors remain. We can restrict the analysis to
non-negative ex ante expectations of the fundamental, ˆ θ ≥ 0, since the discussion of the original
model showed that this is a necessary condition for the proﬁle to be an equilibrium. Because
it is necessarily (weakly) optimal for an investor without information to remain, this directly
implies v(∅,R) = ˆ θ . Suppose investor i deviates by acquiring private information and that she
receives information xi. She will invest if and only if
αˆ θ+βxi
α+β ≥ 0, so if xi ≥ −α
β
ˆ θ. The expected
























































where Φ denotes the normal cumulative density function. The maximum price investor i is
willing to pay for information in the R proﬁle is the diﬀerence between the value of the investment
opportunity with and without information. The value of information as function of the ex ante
expectation of the fundamental is thus given by pR(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,R)] − ˆ θ.
Similarly, consider the W proﬁle where all investors withdraw. We can restrict the analysis to
ˆ θ ≤ 1, which necessarily implies v(∅,W) = 0. Suppose that investor i has acquired information
xi. The negative externality of the withdrawing investors makes her invest if and only if
αˆ θ+βxi
α+β ≥













































β/α (ˆ θ − 1)2
.
Deﬁne pW(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,W)], so that pW(ˆ θ) is the value of information, or equivalently, the
maximum price an investor is willing to pay for information in the W proﬁle.
We continue by considering the Morris-Shin type I proﬁle where all investors acquire infor-
mation and take the investment decision according to a switching point strategy. In contrast
with the R and W proﬁles, the value of information in the I proﬁle is not only coming from
the ability of discriminating between good and bad realizations of the fundamental. In the I
proﬁle investors base their decision whether to run or not on their information. Hence, private
information allows to better predict the private information of other investors and is thus also
useful for predicting the fraction of withdrawing investors.
We assume that γMS < 2π so that there exists a unique switching point x∗. When investor i
has no information, v(∅,I) = max{0,E[θ − `|I]}. Her expectation of the fundamental is ˆ θ. We
can apply the law of large numbers (see Judd (1985)) to show that the fraction of withdrawing
investors is equal to the probability that investor j receives information that is worse than the
switching point, so




(x∗ − ˆ θ)
!
. (6)
Now suppose that investor i decides to acquire information. We ﬁrst compute the expected
value of the investment opportunity conditional on information xi. We have already seen that
θ|xi has a normal distribution with mean
αˆ θ+βxi
α+β and precision α+β. Since Xj|xi = (θ+εj)|xi =




α+2β . The fraction of withdrawing investors in the I equilibrium conditional
on xi is then given by










We now have a detailed expression for v(xi,I) = max{0,E[θ − `|xi,I]}. It is straightforward
to show that this value is increasing in xi. Intuitively, when investor i receives better informa-
tion she expects a better realization of the fundamental and a smaller fraction of withdrawing
investors. The deﬁnition of the switching point gives that E[θ − `|x∗,I] = 0. Hence, investors
only remain if their information is weakly better than x∗. The expected value of the investment
opportunity when an investor has still unknown information thus equals
E[v(Xi,I)] = E[θ − `|Xi ≥ x∗,I]P[Xi ≥ x∗]. (8)LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 8
The expected contribution of the fundamental to the value of the investment opportunity
given the unknown information is
E[θ|Xi ≥ x∗,I]P[Xi ≥ x∗] =
Z ∞
x∗





























α+β(ˆ θ − x∗)2
.
Using Equation (7), we ﬁnd for the expected contribution of ` to the value of the investment
opportunity given the unknown information

























xi − ˆ θ
2
dxi.
Given these ﬁndings, the value of information in the I proﬁle as function of the ex ante
expectation of the fundamental is now given by pI(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,I)] − v(∅,I).
2. Analysis
When investors have to decide whether or not to acquire information, they compare the value
of information with its price. The R proﬁle where all investors remain without acquiring infor-
mation is an equilibrium if the value of information is lower than its price. The same condition
should hold for the W proﬁle where all investors withdraw without acquiring information to be
an equilibrium. However, the I proﬁle where all investors acquire information, is an equilibrium
if the value of information is higher than its price. We ﬁrst state a proposition about the values
of information as function of ˆ θ in the three proﬁles. The implications for the equilibrium follow
directly from this proposition and are summarized in a corollary.
In Figure 1 the value of information for all three proﬁles is shown as function of the ex
ante expectation of the fundamental.6 The ﬁgure also indicates when the equilibria exist. The
following proposition states that for all α and β such that γMS < 2π, the values of information
pR(ˆ θ), pW(ˆ θ) and pI(ˆ θ) behave as depicted in Figure 1 (the condition implies a unique switching
point strategy so that the I proﬁle is well deﬁned).
Proposition 1. Assume that γMS < 2π.
(i) The values of information in the I, R and W proﬁle, pI, pR and pW respectively, are
positive.
(ii) The value of information as function of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental ˆ θ in
the I proﬁle is strictly increasing for ˆ θ < 1
2 and strictly decreasing for ˆ θ > 1
2, in the R
proﬁle it is strictly decreasing and in the W proﬁle it is strictly increasing.
6The vertical lines starting at (0,p
R(0)) and (1,p
W(1)) are included to indicate that for prices higher than
p
R(0) = p
W(1) the R and W equilibrium cannot exist for ˆ θ < 0 and ˆ θ > 1 respectively.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 9
Figure 1. The value of information as function of the ex ante expectation
of the fundamental and the equilibrium regions. (α = 1,β = 1)
(iii) There exists a threshold ¯ θ ∈ (0, 1
2) such that if ˆ θ ≤ ¯ θ the value of information is highest
in the R proﬁle, if ˆ θ ∈ [¯ θ,1− ¯ θ] it is highest in the I proﬁle and if ˆ θ ≥ 1− ¯ θ it is highest
in the W proﬁle.
(iv) For bad ex ante expectations of the fundamental, ˆ θ ≤ 1
2, the value of information is
lowest in the W proﬁle, while for good ex ante expectations of the fundamental, ˆ θ ≥ 1
2,
it is lowest in the R proﬁle.
(v) The values of information in the R and W proﬁles are symmetric images around ˆ θ = 1
2
in the sense that pR(1
2 + d) = pW(1
2 − d), d ≥ −1
2. The value of information in the I
proﬁle is symmetric around ˆ θ = 1
2 in the sense that pI(1
2 + d) = pI(1
2 − d), d ≥ 0.
Statement (i) claims that information always has a positive value. This implies that there
always exist strictly positive prices for which the value of information is higher than its price.
From statement (ii) it follows that when the ex ante expectation of the fundamental increases,
the value of information in the R proﬁle decreases. Intuitively this follows from the fact that
when ˆ θ increases, the probability of making a loss in the R proﬁle decreases, hence the price
an investor is willing to pay for receiving information decreases. A symmetric argument gives
that the foregone positive return in the W proﬁle increases when ˆ θ increases and that the value
of information thus also increases. Statement (ii) also shows that pI behaves similar to pW for
ˆ θ < 1
2 and similar to pR for ˆ θ > 1
2. When ˆ θ < 1
2 an investor in the I proﬁle would withdraw
when she has no information (we prove this in Lemma 6 in Appendix B). The foregone positive
return increases when ˆ θ becomes larger, so the price that an investor is willing to pay for
information increases. When ˆ θ > 1
2 an investor would remain when she has no information. TheLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 10
expected return is increasing in ˆ θ and does so faster than the return in case she would have had
information. Hence, the maximum price an investor is willing to pay for information decreases.
Statement (iii) implies that when ˆ θ is relatively low, information in the R proﬁle is the most
valuable. Intuitively, although the expected return is positive, it is not unlikely that the realized
return will be negative. Investors want to be able to withdraw in these cases which makes
the information valuable. Similarly, when the fundamental is likely to be good, the expected
return of the investment in the W proﬁle is negative but there are many realizations of the
fundamental for which it is positive. Investors want to be able to distinguish these cases which
gives information a high value. Finally, when ˆ θ is intermediate in the I proﬁle, the expected
fraction of withdrawing investors is also intermediate. Information has a high value since it
enables investors to predict which of the two is largest.
From statement (iv) we know that the value of information in the I proﬁle is never the lowest
of the three. The intuition why for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 the value of information in the W proﬁle is lower
than in the I proﬁle is straightforward. Since in the latter there is always a positive fraction
of investors who remain, the expected return of remaining will always be higher than in the W
proﬁle.
Finally, statement (v) shows that the R and W proﬁles are not only symmetric in the sense
that in the one all investors remain and in the other all investors withdraw, but that this
symmetry goes further: pR(1
2 + d) = pW(1
2 − d). The intuition is as follows. In the R proﬁle
an investor without information remains, while with information she can withdraw for very bad
information. The value of information is thus minus the return in case of bad information. In the
W proﬁle the value of information is the return in case of good information. For fundamentals
1
2 −d and 1
2 +d these values are the same. Statement (v) also shows that pI(1
2 +d) = pI(1
2 −d).
Although somewhat more involved, the intuition is as before: for ˆ θ = 1
2 − d information allows
investors to remain when positive returns are expected, while for 1
2 + d it allows investors to
withdraw when negative returns are expected.
The R and W equilibrium only exist when the value of information is higher than its price.
The I equilibrium instead only exists when the value is lower than the price. The existence of
an equilibrium for all ˆ θ now follows from the fact that pI(ˆ θ) > min{pR(ˆ θ),pW(ˆ θ)} (statement
(iv) of Proposition 1). The intuition for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 is as follows. In this case an investor without
information should withdraw in the I equilibrium. The diﬀerence between pI(ˆ θ) and pW(ˆ θ) is
thus only caused by diﬀerent returns when information is acquired. In the I proﬁle there are
always some investors who remain. Conditional on the same private information, the expected
return in the I proﬁle is higher than in the W proﬁle. An investor with private information is
more willing to remain in the I proﬁle than in the W proﬁle (her switching point is lower). But
this increases the return of other investors, who are in turn more willing to remain, etc. This
implies that pI(ˆ θ) > pW(ˆ θ). A symmetric argument explains why pI(ˆ θ) > pR(ˆ θ) when ˆ θ ≥ 1
2.
We conclude that the strategic complementarity in information acquisition ensures the existence
of an equilibrium.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 11
Let p denote the price of information. The following corollary reconciles the Diamond-Dybvig
and the Morris-Shin world in a formal way.
Corollary 2. Assume γMS < 2π.
(i) The I proﬁle is the unique equilibrium if and only if p < min{pR(ˆ θ),pW(ˆ θ)}.
The R and W proﬁles are the only equilibria candidates if and only if p > pI(ˆ θ).
(ii) The R proﬁle is the unique equilibrium if and only if both p > pI(ˆ θ) and in addition
ˆ θ ≤ 1 implies p < pW(ˆ θ)).
The W proﬁle is the unique equilibrium if and only if both p > pI(ˆ θ) and in addition
ˆ θ ≥ 0 implies p < pR(ˆ θ).
(iii) The sets {(ˆ θ,p) ∈ [0,1]×(0,∞)| Q is the unique equilibrium}, Q ∈ {I,R,W}, are non-
empty.
In Appendix A we prove that if the I, R or W proﬁle is the unique equilibrium among
symmetric proﬁles, it is also the unique equilibrium if we allow for non-symmetric proﬁles.
Statement (i) relates the Diamond-Dybvig and the Morris-Shin world. If the price of in-
formation is suﬃciently high, investors do not acquire private information. We arrive in the
Diamond-Dybvig world where only the R equilibrium and the W can exist. If the price is suf-
ﬁciently low, we arrive in the Morris-Shin world where investors acquire information and the I
proﬁle is the unique equilibrium. From statement (i) of Proposition 1 we know that pR(ˆ θ) and
pW(ˆ θ) are strictly positive for every ˆ θ. This implies that for every ˆ θ there are positive prices for
which the I equilibrium is unique. Hence, although there are ﬁnite prices that guarantee that
we are in the Diamond-Dybvig world regardless of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental,
in fact any price higher than pI(1
2) achieves this, we are only for sure in the Morris-Shin world
when p = 0, so when the private information is for free.
From statement (ii) it follows that our model is doing more than embedding the two models.
While in the original Diamond-Dybvig the R equilibrium exists for ˆ θ ≥ 0 and the W equilibrium
for ˆ θ ≤ 1, in our model there are diﬀerent conditions. This reﬂects that the possibility of
acquiring information reduces the equilibrium regions.
Statement (iii) emphasizes the implications of statements (i) and (ii) for intermediate ex ante
expectations of the fundamentals. For ˆ θ ∈ [0,1] the R and W proﬁles are both equilibria
if private information is not available. In our model, however, the I proﬁle is the unique
equilibrium for suﬃciently low (but still positive) prices. Also, statements (iii) and (iv) of
Proposition 1 show that there exists a threshold ¯ θ ∈ (0, 1
2) such that when ˆ θ ∈ (1− ˆ θ,1] we have
pW(ˆ θ) > pI(ˆ θ) > pR(ˆ θ). Hence, for ˆ θ ∈ (1 − ¯ θ,1] and p ∈ (pI(ˆ θ),pW(ˆ θ)) the R equilibrium is
unique. Similarly, the W equilibrium is unique for ˆ θ ∈ [0, ¯ θ) and p ∈ (pI(ˆ θ),pR(ˆ θ)). Compared
to the model without private information the W equilibrium is eliminated for ˆ θ close to 1, while
the R equilibrium is eliminated when ˆ θ is close to 0. It is the intuitively more likely equilibrium
that survives: R when the ex ante expectation of the fundamental is good, W when it is bad.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 12
It is interesting to look more carefully at the two ways the multiplicity of the original Diamond-
Dybvig model with ˆ θ ∈ [0,1] disappears for some combinations of ˆ θ and p. First, for low prices
of information investors have private information, which replaces the multiple equilibria with a
unique hybrid switching point equilibrium. Ruling out multiplicity was in fact the very reason
that private information was introduced in Morris and Shin (2000). Second, for low but not
very low prices and ˆ θ close to 0 or 1, the original multiplicity disappears since investors can
have private information. It is the sheer possibility of being able to acquire information that
eliminates one of the equilibria.
For intermediate prices the Diamond-Dybvig and Morris-Shin worlds are blended. For ex-
ample, when ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 both the I and the W equilibrium occur when the price is between pW(ˆ θ)
and pI(ˆ θ). For ˆ θ close to 1
2 even the R equilibrium joins and the multiplicity icnreases. Hence,
sunspots are not ruled out when the price is not convincingly low or high. But the jump is
not necessarily extreme in the sense that all investors suddenly change behavior. The hybrid I
equilibrium where some investors remain and others withdraw can smooth a jump.
Our model presents a partitioning of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental in two
dimensions. Liquidity run models without private information typically have a one dimensional
partitioning where a run occurs when ˆ θ is bad, no run occurs when ˆ θ is good, and both a
run or no run can occur for intermediate ˆ θ. Liquidity run models with private information
typically have the trivial partitioning of a unique hybrid equilibrium where a fraction of the
investors withdraws for all ˆ θ. The extent of the run is then decreasing in ˆ θ. In our model these
one-dimensional partitionings arise for high prices (p > pI(1
2)) or for free private information
(p = 0). In general, the partitioning of ˆ θ depends on the price of information and concerns
three diﬀerent equilibria. The ex ante expectation of the fundamental and the price together
determine whether or not a run occurs and its extent.
In the original Diamond-Dybvig model with ˆ θ ∈ [0,1], not only the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental, but also its precision does not play a role in the equilibrium selection. However, the
availability of private information makes that besides β also α has an eﬀect on the maximum
prices. Since a high transparency is associated with a high precision of private information
available for a low price, we can expect that an increase in β has the same eﬀect as a decrease
in the price of information, which suggests that the value of information increases. When α
decreases, the relative importance of the private information increases, so intuitively we expect
results similar to an increase in β. The following proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 3. Assume γMS < 2π. The value of information in the R, W and I proﬁles is
decreasing in α and increasing in β.
When the precision of the fundamental decreases or the precision of private information
increases, an investor with information is better able to distinguish the cases where the return
will be positive from the cases where it will be negative. This ensures that in the R and the
W proﬁles she will receive a higher return and that the value of information increases. In theLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 13
I proﬁle an increase in the precision of private information or a decrease in the precision of
the fundamental has the same eﬀect. For ex ante bad fundamentals (ˆ θ < 1
2) the intuition is
straightforward: better information is positive since it allows investors to better distinguish good
ex post fundamentals which makes investors more willing to invest. The expected return when
acquiring information thus increases while without information the investor will still withdraw.
This shows that the value of information increases. For ex ante good fundamentals (ˆ θ > 1
2)
the intuition is not so clear: investors can also better distinguish the cases of good and bad
realizations of the fundamentals. Since without private information it is optimal to remain,
investors are now more inclined to withdraw. This reduces the expected return when acquiring
information, but it also reduces the expected return when not acquiring information. Since the
value of information is symmetric in ˆ θ = 1
2, we know that the second eﬀect is stronger.
Combining Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 gives insight in how the equilibria depend on the
precisions of the private information and the fundamental. When the investment project is
likely to have a bad fundamental, ˆ θ < 1
2, relatively cheap information with a high precision,
so a high transparency, will help to attract investors. The reason is simple. Information with
a high precision has a high value. When its price is low, investors are inclined to acquire
information. We expect the I equilibrium to exist and not the W equilibrium. A low volatility
of the fundamental has an opposite eﬀect. When a bad fundamental is likely, a low volatility
of the fundamental makes a bad realization very likely. Information is not very useful in the W
proﬁle and we expect the W equilibrium to exist. A very volatile fundamental makes private
information very useful and we expect that the I proﬁle is an equilibrium. A decrease in α
and an increase in β thus favor information acquisition. When the price is not too high, the
information acquisition favors the I equilibrium at the expense of the W equilibrium. Since in
the I equilibrium some investors remain, the run is less severe than in the W equilibrium. This
reﬂects the eﬀect of a decrease in α or an increase in β in the I equilibrium itself, where investors
are more willing to remain when private information becomes relatively more important (see
the proof of the proposition).
When the ex ante expectation of the fundamental is relatively good, ˆ θ > 1
2, a decrease in α
and an increase in β favor information acquisition for the same reason. However, the eﬀect on
the run is opposite. When the price is not too high, the information acquisition favors the I
equilibrium at the expense of the R equilibrium. More investors withdraw and the run is more
severe. Again this reﬂects the eﬀects inside the I equilibrium.
For global game models where agents have private information, it is common practice to
discuss the limiting case where the private information becomes arbitrarily precise. Combining
Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 shows that when β increases to inﬁnity, the price range for which
the I proﬁle is unique expands. For this limiting case the constraint on the price of information
becomes less severe, and for not too high prices we indeed expect the agents to acquire private
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Instead of changing the precision β of the private information, we could also allow investors to
choose between information with precision β and information with precision β2 > β for a higher
price. Since there is a new deviation possible, the R and W equilibrium regions will be smaller.
The eﬀect on the I equilibrium region is unclear. Although the new deviation makes the region
of the I equilibrium with precision β smaller, the additional region of the I equilibrium with
precision β2 may oﬀset this eﬀect. In the next section we generalize this extension and discuss
a model where investors can choose information with any precision.
3. Extension
In this section we loosen the restriction that investors can only acquire information with an
exogenously given precision β. We endogenize the precision by letting investors choose their
preferred precision. The price of information is a linear function of its precision, so information
with precision β costs βˆ p, where ˆ p > 0 denotes the price of information per unit precision.
Modelling the information acquisition in this way reﬂects the possibility of investors to buy
β ∈ [0,∞) units of information with unit precision and price ˆ p each. Note that the cost of
information is a convex function of the variance: information with half the variance costs double.
We conjecture that qualitatively similar results are obtained for more general structures if the
price as function of the precision is increasing and convex.
To indicate that the expected value of the investment opportunity conditional on information
xi depends on the precision β of this information, we will write v(xi,Q;β), Q ∈ {I,R,W}. Since
an investor without private information is identical to an investor with unrelated information,
which is information with zero precision, we slightly abuse notation by letting β = 0 refer to
this case (i.e. E[v(Xi,Q;0] = E[v(∅,Q)]).
First consider the R proﬁle with ˆ θ ≥ 0. The problem of investor i is
max
β≥0
E[v(Xi,R;β)] − βˆ p, (11)
where Equation (4) gives an expression for E[v(Xi,R;β)] if β > 0. Since an investor will remain
when her information is better than −α
β
ˆ θ, we see that if the precision goes to zero, she will
always remain. Hence, limβ→0 E[v(Xi,R;β)] − βˆ p = E[v(Xi,R;0)] and the objective function
is continuous in β. Since the maximum return of investing is bounded, we know that when
β becomes very large, the total return becomes negative. Hence, instead of maximizing over
[0,∞) we can maximize over a certain closed interval [0, ¯ β] without aﬀecting the outcome, so
the maximum is well-deﬁned.
We are interested in the maximum price per unit precision for which an investor acquires
information. In Section 1 we derived the maximum price that an investor is willing to pay
for information with precision β. To explicitly indicate the dependence on β we denote this
maximum price by pR(ˆ θ;β). Hence, when the price per unit precision equals
pR(ˆ θ;β)
β we know
that investor i acquires information. The maximum price per unit precision for which an investor
wants to acquire information is then given by ˆ pR(ˆ θ) = maxβ>0
pR(ˆ θ;β)
β . To prove that thisLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 15



















Since the return is always ﬁnite the maximum price per unit precision goes to zero for β → ∞,
which shows that the maximum is well deﬁned. We will refer to ˆ pR(ˆ θ) as the standardized
value of information. When the price of information per unit precision is higher than the
standardized value of information ˆ pR(ˆ θ), an investor will not acquire information and hence
the R equilibrium exists. Since Proposition 1 states that all
pR(ˆ θ;β)
β decrease in ˆ θ, their upper
envelope ˆ pR is decreasing in ˆ θ as well.
Now consider the W proﬁle with ˆ θ ≤ 1. Investor i needs to solve
max
β≥0
E[v(Xi,W;β)] − βˆ p, (13)
and an expression for E[v(Xi,W;β)] if β > 0 is given in Equation (5). In the same way as for
the R proﬁle it can be proved that the maximum is well-deﬁned. Similarly to the R proﬁle the
standardized value of information is given by ˆ pW(ˆ θ) = maxβ>0
pW(ˆ θ;β)
β . The W equilibrium only
exists if there is no positive precision for which the standardized value of information is larger
than its price. From Proposition 1 it follows that ˆ pW is increasing in ˆ θ and that ˆ pR and ˆ pW are
symmetric images around ˆ θ = 1
2.
For the I proﬁle we focus on investor i. We assume that all other investors choose precision
βj > 0 and act according to a switching point strategy where the switching point x∗
j satisﬁes
E[θ − `|x∗
j] = 0. The uniqueness condition is not satisﬁed for very small values of βj. For these
precisions we restrict the set of allowed strategies to switching point strategies.7 In order to ﬁnd
her optimal precision, investor i has to solve the problem
max
β≥0
E[v(Xi,I;β)] − βˆ p, (14)
where an expression for E[v(Xi,I;0)] = v(∅,I) is given in Section 1. Of course, in equilibrium
we should have that the maximizing β is equal to βj. In order to determine the existence of an
equilibrium we need more detailed expressions. As before, v(xi,I;β) is increasing in xi. Thus
for every β > 0 there exists a unique x∗(β) such that investor i leaves if xi < x∗(β) and remains
otherwise (we suppress the dependency of x∗(β) on βj). Since the information of another investor





value of x∗(β) for β > 0 is determined by













7Alternatively, for a given precision of the fundamental α we could have restricted the set of allowed private




(α − 2π)2 + 4πα) > 0 is the unique precision of private
information such that γMS =
√
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We denote by ˆ pI(ˆ θ) the maximum price per unit precision for which investor i is willing to
acquire information in an I equilibrium as a function of ˆ θ and refer to ˆ pI(ˆ θ) as the standardized
value of information. Since the free variable β appears eleven times in Equation (16), once
even as the argument of an implicitly deﬁned variable, we did not succeed in ﬁnding an explicit
expression for the optimal β. However, for low unit prices an equilibrium exists, and we give
a sketch of the proof for ˆ θ < 1
2 (the proposition below states that ˆ pI is symmetric in ˆ θ = 1
2).
Similar to the R proﬁle we can prove that the maximization problem is well deﬁned. We can
then see this maximization problem as a mapping from βj to β. For βj close to 0, there is an
equilibrium where almost all the investors withdraw. Comparison with the W proﬁle shows that
for low enough unit prices investor i wants precision β > βj. Since the return is bounded, we
know that for very large βj investor i wants precision β < βj. When the mapping is continuous
a ﬁxed point is guaranteed, which shows the existence of an equilibrium for low unit prices.
Numerical results show that the chosen precision is decreasing in the price and |ˆ θ − 1
2|. The
ﬁrst is obvious. The latter follows from the fact that when ˆ θ is close to 1
2 the uncertainty about
the sign of the return is highest and investors want to have precise information. For high prices
the mapping from βj to β is not necessarily continuous. The reason is that the maximum of the
expected return as function of β decreases when the price of information increases. When the
peak drops below zero, the guaranteed return of zero when withdrawing implies that there is a
sudden jump from a positive precision to zero precision. Indeed, when the price equals ˆ pI(ˆ θ),
both a zero precision (no information) and a positive precision are optimal responses. Similar
to the basic model there is an equilibrium where investors acquire informative information when
the price equals pI(ˆ θ). The strategic complementarities in information acquisition imply that
the W proﬁle is an equilibrium for prices below pI(ˆ θ) which guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium.
In Figure 2 the standardized value of information for all three proﬁles is shown as function
of the ex ante expectation of the fundamental. The following proposition states that for all
α and β the standardized value of information as function of ˆ θ in the R and the W proﬁles
behave as depicted in the ﬁgure, and that the standardized value of information in the I proﬁle
is symmetric.
Proposition 4.
(i) The standardized values of information as function of the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental ˆ θ in the R and the W proﬁle, ˆ pR and ˆ pW, are strictly decreasing respectively
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Figure 2. The standardized value of information as function of the ex
ante expectation of the fundamental. (α = 1, the thin lines show the value
of information for β = 1)
(ii) The standardized value of information is higher in the R proﬁle than in the W proﬁle if
and only if ˆ θ < 1
2.
(iii) The standardized values of information in the R and W proﬁles are symmetric images
around ˆ θ = 1
2 in the sense that ˆ pR(1
2 +d) = ˆ pW(1
2 −d), d ≥ −1
2. The standardized value
of information in the I proﬁle is symmetric around ˆ θ = 1
2 in the sense that ˆ pI(1
2 + d) =
ˆ pI(1
2 − d), d ≥ 0.
Comparing this proposition to Proposition 1 shows that the standardized values of information
in the R and W proﬁles behave similar to their non-standardized counterparts. Since for all
β we know that ˆ pR(ˆ θ) ≥
pR(ˆ θ;β)
β and ˆ pW(ˆ θ) ≥
pW(ˆ θ;β)
β , the regions where the R and the W
equilibria are eliminated are expanded. Loosely speaking, the statements made in Corollary 2
are strengthened if the precision is free to choose. Figure 2 suggests that the statements for
the I proﬁle are qualitatively the same. Numerical analysis shows that it depends on α and
β whether or not ˆ pI is higher than pI/β at the tails and/or the peak. However, the form of
ˆ pI remains roughly similar. The reason why ˆ pI increases for ˆ θ < 1
2 and decreases for ˆ θ > 1
2 is
the same as before: the closer the ex ante expectation of the fundamental to 1
2, so the more
uncertainty about the sign of the return, the more valuable the information is. We conclude that
the statements of Corollary 2 are robust, if not strengthened, when the investors can choose the
precision of their information.LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 18
4. Related Literature
The literature on liquidity runs that emerged from the Diamond-Dybvig model is vast. An
excellent survey is given by Gorton and Winton (2003). In a recent paper, Bernardo and Welch
(2004) tailor the model to describe ﬁnancial market runs. In their liquidity run model the mul-
tiplicity that typically arises for intermediate priors in Diamond-Dybvig settings is eliminated
by share prices and risk averse market-makers. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) introduce costless
noisy private information in the original model with patient and impatient investors. This elim-
inates the multiplicity for intermediate fundamentals and allows for computing the probability
of a runs.
This Morris-Shin way of modelling agents with incomplete private information in a global
game setting is widely followed to analyze the impact of private information in these kind of
coordination games. The multiplicity that can occur in the absence of private information is
eliminated by the introduction of a hybrid equilibrium. The partitioning of the fundamental
thus only consists of regions with unique equilibria, see Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) and Metz
(2002). The prediction of a unique equilibrium for suﬃciently precise information is conﬁrmed
by an experimental study discussed by Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2004). In response
to comments on the original model, see Atkeson (2000) and Rey (2000), several more realis-
tic models have been developed that preserve this uniqueness result. For example, Tarashev
(2003) introduces an interest rate in a currency crises model. The interest rate informs the
investors about the actions (and thus about the information) of other investors without leading
to common perfect information and multiple equilibria. Angeletos and Werning (2005) show
that multiplicity can also be eliminated in case a secondary market exists where an asset price
imperfectly aggregates private information. Carlson and Hale (2005) show that the introduction
of a rating agency that provides free public information makes investments less responsive to
changes in the fundamentals but do not signiﬁcantly alter the character of the equilibria.
Interestingly, the presumption that multiplicity is an artifact of common knowledge that can
be eliminated by the introduction of private information starts to become challenged in more
elaborated models. Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinsky (2005) also discuss the role of interest
rates in self-fulﬁlling currency crises. Their main ﬁnding is that the multiplicity emerges even
if private information is available. It is interesting to note that they derive public knowledge
from private knowledge, while in our model information acquisition is determined by public
information. However, both models suggest that the dichotomy “private information/no private
information” in relation to “uniqueness/multiplicity” gives a simpliﬁed picture.
Several papers focus on information acquisition in settings with strategic complementarities.
In the model of Nikitin (2004), investors can acquire complete information about the return of
all investment opportunities. Although the three equilibria resemble the equilibria in our model,
the model is rather complex and the equilibrium analysis necessarily only focuses on explaining
that the three equilibria can occur instead of elaborating on how the interaction of fundamentals
and prices eﬀect the existence of these equilibria. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2005) mainly analyzesLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 19
the eﬀect of costly, private information on beauty contest models. Although the structure of the
model is similar to the structure of our model, only the squared distance to a realized random
variable matters for the payoﬀs. This is a key diﬀerence since it makes the expected value of the
random variable irrelevant for the equilibrium analysis, while this is at the heart of our analysis.
The equilibrium analysis of our model showed that an increase in the relative precision of
private information has diﬀerent eﬀects for good and bad priors for the fundamentals. This is
a common feature in the global games literature, see for example Metz (2002) and Sbracia and
Zaghini (2001). Prati and Sbracia (2002) provide empirical evidence for this prediction.
5. Conclusion
This paper discusses a stylized model of liquidity runs where private information acquisition of
investors is endogenous. Investors decide optimally whether or not to acquire private information
taking its price as given. This provides a two dimensional equilibrium partitioning of the prior
for the fundamentals and the price of information. The existence of an equilibrium for all
prices follows from strategic complementarities in information acquisition. The multiplicity
that occurs for intermediate priors in models without private information can be eliminated by
the information that investors can have. Even equilibria without private information can be
unique for intermediate priors. These results are qualitatively preserved when information of
any precision is available for a price that is linearly increasing in the precision.
Endogenous information acquisition does aﬀect the occurrence and the extent of the run.
Only when the price of private information is high or very low, the information structure can
be taken as ﬁxed without aﬀecting the results. For intermediate prices the artiﬁcial dichotomy
“private information/no private information” is treacherous. This is most clear when priors are
intermediate. In this case, regardless of whether the prior is relatively good or bad, both a full
run or no run can occur when private information is not available, while a partial run occurs in
case the ﬁxed information structure contains private information. However, in our model with
endogenous information acquisition, no run occurs when the prior is relatively good and a full
run occurs when the prior is relatively bad.
A promising direction for future research is to embed the model in a dynamic context. The
unique equilibria for some price-prior combinations together with the multiple equilibria that
occur for other combinations suggest a role for hysteresis. Speciﬁcally, for countries with improv-
ing fundamentals this implies a lock-in eﬀect since the fundamental has to improve considerably
before investors become suﬃciently interested to acquire information and consider investing.
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Appendix A - Non-Symmetric Equilibria
In the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there exists a non-symmetric equilibrium (a
mixed strategy equilibrium). In the original paper this is not analyzed since it is not econom-
ically meaningful. Here we show that all non-symmetric equilibria of our model have similar
characteristics. We assume that γMS < 2π. This guarantees that in case an investor acquires
information, the existence of dominant regions implies that we can focus on strategies where
investors with information act according to a switching point strategy.
The discussion of non-symmetric equilibria below is reﬂected in Figure 3. Confronting this
ﬁgure with Figure 1 gives the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume γMS < 2π. If there is a unique equilibrium among the symmetric
proﬁles, then there does not exist a non-symmetric equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward: a non-symmetric equilibrium can only arise if there are at
least two equilibria that can be mixed. The details are more complicated and discussed below.
In the non-symmetric equilibrium of the original model with ˆ θ ∈ [0,1] some investors with-
draw and others remain. In the setting of our model, a fraction ˆ θ of the investors withdraws andLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 21
Figure 3. The non-symmetric equilibria regions. (α = 1,β = 1)
a fraction 1−ˆ θ remains. Denote this non-symmetric equilibrium by RW. Since E[θ−`|RW] = 0
investors are indeed indiﬀerent between remaining and leaving. The reason why this equilibrium
is not economically meaningful is that the extent of the run is increasing in the ex ante expec-
tation of the fundamental. This equilibrium does not exist for all prices. Since E[θ − `|RW]
has a normal distribution with zero mean and precision α, we know that for all ˆ θ the value of
information is given by pR(0) = pW(1). For prices of at least this value the RW equilibrium
exists.
Denote by IW a proﬁle where a fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of the investors acquires information
and has a switching point strategy while the remaining fraction 1 − λ leaves without acquiring
information. Denote by v(xi,IW) the value of the investment opportunity given information
xi. In equilibrium an investor without information should weakly prefer to withdraw, so E[θ −
λ`|IW] − (1 − λ) ≤ 0, and the value of unknown information should equal the price p, so
E[v(Xi,IW)] = p. The switching point x∗ is determined by E[θ − λ`|x∗,IW] − (1 − λ) = 0. An
investor who acquires information remains with positive probability while without information
she withdraws for sure. Hence, the fraction of remaining investors is increasing in λ which implies
that the switching point x∗ is decreasing in λ. The value of the investment opportunity given
information xi in this equilibrium is given by v(xi,IW) = max{0,E[θ − λ`|xi,IW] − (1 − λ)}.
When x∗ decreases, v(xi,IW) is positive for a larger range of private information and for every
xi in this range the expected fraction of withdrawing investors is less. Hence E[v(Xi,IW)] is
decreasing in x∗ and thus it is increasing in λ. In the proof of Lemma 6 in Appendix B it is shown
that x∗ is decreasing in ˆ θ. This implies that E[v(Xi,IW)] is increasing in ˆ θ. This shows that
for a ﬁxed price, λ should decrease in ˆ θ. So, when the ex ante expectation of the fundamentalLIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 22
improves, more investors leave. Similarly, when p increases, λ also increases. Hence, for higher
prices more investors want information.
For ˆ θ ≤ 1
2, the IW equilibrium only exists in the interior of the region where both the I and
the W equilibrium exist. Consider ˆ θ < 1
2. In the last paragraph we have seen that λ is increasing
in p. There is only one price for which λ = 0, and this price is given by pW(ˆ θ). Similarly, pI(ˆ θ) is
the unique price for which λ = 1 and the value of the investment opportunity equals its price. It
follows that only for p ∈ (pW(ˆ θ),pI(ˆ θ)) the IW proﬁle exists with λ ∈ (0,1). When λ increases,
the expected fraction of remaining investors increases as well, hence the return of an investor
who does not acquire information and remains is increasing in λ. But Lemma 6 of Appendix
B shows that when p = pI(ˆ θ) an investor without information should withdraw. Thus, also for
p ∈ (pW(ˆ θ),pI(ˆ θ)) an investor without information should withdraw. We conclude that for these
prices the IW proﬁle is a non-symmetric equilibrium.
For ˆ θ > 1
2 the region where the IW equilibrium exists is more complex. In the I equilibrium
the value of the investment opportunity given unknown information is E[v(Xi,I)]. We know that
for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 this value equals pI(ˆ θ). Similar reasoning to above now gives that the IW proﬁle only
exists with λ ∈ (0,1) if p ∈ (pW(ˆ θ),E[v(Xi,I)]). The expected return of an investor who remains
without acquiring information is strictly increasing in λ. For prices close to pW(ˆ θ) it is negative.
Similar to the proof that pI(ˆ θ) is increasing in ˆ θ for ˆ θ < 1
2, we can prove that E[v(Xi,I)] is
increasing in ˆ θ. Since this implies that E[v(Xi,I)] > pI(ˆ θ) an investor who remains without
acquiring information expects a positive return when the price is close to E[v(Xi,I)]. There
thus exist a unique ¯ pIW(ˆ θ) ∈ (pW(ˆ θ),E[v(Xi,I)]) such that the expected return equals zero. We
know that ¯ pIW(1
2) = pI(1
2) and that ¯ pIW(1) = pW(1) (note that pI(1
2) > pW(1) = pR(0) since
the uncertainty about the behavior of the other investors increases the value of information in
the I equilibrium). For p ∈ (pW(ˆ θ), ¯ pIW(ˆ θ)) the IW equilibrium exists with λ ∈ (0,1).
Denote by IR a proﬁle where a fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of the investors acquires information and
has a switching point strategy while the remaining fraction 1 − λ remains without acquiring
information. The switching point is then determined by E[θ − λ`|x∗] = 0. Arguments similar
to above show that the switching point x∗ is now increasing in λ. This proﬁle can only be an
equilibrium if the price of information satisﬁes E[v(Xi,IR)] − v(∅,IR) = p. Due to symmetry
with the IW case, we know that the left hand side is increasing in λ. Also due to symmetry, the
left hand side is decreasing in ˆ θ. We thus get that an increase in ˆ θ or an increase in p lead to
an increase in λ. So, when the ex ante expectation of the fundamental improves less investors
remain and when the price of information increases more investors acquire information.
From the symmetry with respect to the IW proﬁle, we know that for ˆ θ ≥ 1
2 the IR equilibrium
only exists in the interior of the region where both the I and R equilibrium exist. For ˆ θ < 1
2,
there exist ¯ pIR(ˆ θ) such that the expected return of an investor who remains without acquiring
information is zero. It follows that ¯ pIR(0) = pR(0), ¯ pIR(1
2) = pI(1
2). The IR equilibrium with
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Denote by IRW a proﬁle where a fraction of the investors remains without acquiring infor-
mation, a fraction withdraws without acquiring information and the remaining investors acquire
information. This equilibrium only exists in the interior of the region where the IR, the IW
and the RW equilibria exist. So, for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 only if p ∈ (pR(0), ¯ pIR(ˆ θ)) and for ˆ θ ≥ 0 only if
p ∈ (pW(1), ¯ pIW(ˆ θ)). For lower prices more investors want to acquire information, which in-
creases the uncertainty and thus makes information more valuable. For higher prices investors
do not want to acquire information. For a worse ex ante expectation of the fundamental in-
vestors prefer to withdraw, for a better one they prefer to stay. For reasons explained above,
the expected fraction of withdrawing investors is increasing in the ex ante expectation of the
fundamental, while the fraction of investors who acquire information is increasing in the price.
Appendix B - Proofs
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma where x∗(ˆ θ) denotes the switching point as function of the
ex ante expectation of the fundamental.
Lemma 6.
(i) v(∅,I) = 0 if ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 and v(∅,I) = E[θ − `|I] if ˆ θ ≥ 1
2
(ii) x∗(1
2 + d) = 1 − x∗(1
2 − d)
Note that (i) states that an investor without information in the I equilibrium should withdraw
if and only if ˆ θ < 1
2.
Proof of Lemma 6.






α+β − ˆ θ)). In equilibrium we should have


















α+β − ˆ θ
2















α+β − ˆ θ
2
 > 0, (18)
where the inequality in the last line is implied by the condition γMS < 2π. Now the implicit
function theorem gives ∂
∂ˆ θx∗(ˆ θ) = −
∂A/∂ˆ θ



















x∗(ˆ θ) − 1

< 0. (19)
But then E[θ − `|I] is increasing in ˆ θ. Note that x∗(1
2) = 1
2 and thus E[θ − `|I] = 0 if ˆ θ = 1
2.
This implies that E[θ − `|I] ≤ 0 if and only if ˆ θ ≤ 1
2.
(ii) The deﬁnition of x∗(ˆ θ) gives for 1
2 − d
α(1









2 − d) −
α(1
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Now subtract both sides from 1 to arrive at
α(1










2 − d)) −
α(1





This last line is exactly the deﬁnition of x∗(1
2 + d).
Proof of Proposition 1.
(v) The statement about pR and pW follows directly from the deﬁnitions of pR and pW and
Equations (4) and (5). The proof of the statement about pI is more involved. We will relate the
variables when ˆ θ = 1
2 −d to the variables when ˆ θ = 1
2 +d. We add the value of ˆ θ as a subscript
to E and P in order to explicitly denote the dependence of expectations and probabilities on ˆ θ.
From Lemma 6 we know that x∗(1
2+d) = 1−x∗(1




2 − d) − (1
2 − d)). Use Equation (9) to get that
E1
2 − d[θ|Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 − d),I]P1
2 − d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 − d)] (22)
... − E1
2 + d[θ|Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d),I]P1




2 + d[Xi < x∗(1
2 + d)] − (1
2 + d)P1
2 + d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d)]
= −(1
2 + d) + P1
2 + d[Xi < x∗(1
2 + d)].
Now note that E1
2 − d[`|Xi ≥ θ∗
s(1
2 −d),I]P1
2 − d[Xi ≥ θ∗
s(1
2 −d)] = P1
2 − d[Xj < x∗(1
2 −d)∧
Xi > x∗(1
2 − d)]. This in turn equals
E1
2 − d[P[Xj < x∗(1
2 − d)|θ]P[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 − d)|θ]] (23)
= E1
2 + d[P[Xj < 1 − x∗(1
2 + d)|1 − θ]P[Xi < 1 − x∗(1
2 + d)|1 − θ]]
= E1
2 + d[P[Xj ≥ x∗(1
2 + d)|θ]P[Xi < x∗(1
2 + d)|θ]].
where we used that Xj|θ and Xi|θ are independent, that the involved precisions do not change
and that the normal distribution is symmetric. When we interchange i and j, the expression
in the last line of Equation (23) is equal to E1
2 + d[`|Xi ≥ θ∗
s(1
2 + d),I]P1
2 + d[Xi ≥ θ∗
s(1
2 + d)].
We conclude that the expected contribution of ` to the return of an investor is the same for
ˆ θ = 1
2 − d and ˆ θ = 1
2 + d.
Combining this ﬁnding and Equation (22) we get
E1
2 − d[v(Xi,I)] = E1
2 + d[v(Xi,I)] −

(1
2 + d) − P1




From the lemma we know that v(∅,I) = 0 for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2 and v(∅,I) = E[θ − `|I] for ˆ θ ≥ 1
2. By
recognizing that the last term of Equation (24) is exactly the expected return of an investor
without information who remains in the I equilibrium, we ﬁnally get pI(1
2 + d) = pI(1
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(ii) Due to the symmetry of pR and pW which was proved in (v), we only have to prove the
statement for pR. Using Equation (4) we obtain
∂
∂ˆ θ






− 1 < 0. (25)
Due to symmetry we only have to prove the statement about pI for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2. From the lemma
we know that pI(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,I)] for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2. The deﬁnition of pI(ˆ θ) shows that a change in ˆ θ has
an eﬀect via the expected return in case the information is better than the switching point, and
via the expected return due to a diﬀerent investment decision in case the information equals the
switching point. For the ﬁrst eﬀect we ﬁnd
∂
∂ˆ θ




























We conclude that ∂
∂ˆ θv(xi,I) > 0 for ˆ θ < 1
2, so for the values of the information for which the
investor already would have remained, her return will be higher. The proof is ﬁnished when
noting that ∂
∂ˆ θx∗(ˆ θ) < 0 implies that the range of information for which an investor expects a
positive return increases.
(iv) Due to symmetry it suﬃces to prove the statement only for ˆ θ < 1
2. The symmetry of pR
and pW and (ii) imply that pR(ˆ θ) > pW(ˆ θ). Given (ii) we have to prove that pI(ˆ θ) > pW(ˆ θ). From
the lemma we know that pI(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,I)] for ˆ θ < 1
2. Since there is always a strictly positive





ˆ θ}. Hence, v(xi,I) ≥ v(xi,W) for all xi while a strict inequality holds for
xi > x∗. Since these values have a positive probability mass, we have E[v(Xi,I)] > E[v(Xi,W)]
which implies that pI(ˆ θ) > pW(ˆ θ) for ˆ θ < 1
2.
(i) Due to (iv) and (v) we only have to proof that pW(ˆ θ) > 0 for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2. We know that




ˆ θ, which happens with positive probability. Since v(xi,W) = 0
otherwise, we know that pW(ˆ θ) = E[v(Xi,W)] > 0.
(iii) Due to symmetry it suﬃces to prove the statement only for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2. The symmetry of pR
and pW and (ii) imply that pR(ˆ θ) > pW(ˆ θ) for ˆ θ < 1
2. Given (ii) and (iv) we have to prove that
pR(0) > pI(0). But this holds since from arguments similar to the ones used in (iii) it follows
that E[v(Xi,R)] > E[v(Xi,I)].
Proof of Proposition 3.
Due to symmetry of pR and pW it suﬃces to prove the statement for pR. Since pR(ˆ θ) =LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 26
E[v(Xi,R)] − ˆ θ, we can use Equation (4) to obtain
∂
∂α




































Due to symmetry of pI in ˆ θ = 1
2 it suﬃces to give the proof for ˆ θ ≤ 1
2, and due to continuity
it even suﬃces to only consider ˆ θ < 1
2. From the lemma we know that an investor without
information withdraws. The value of information is then given by E[v(Xi,I)]. For reasons
explained in the proof of Proposition 1 (i) this value is decreasing in the switching point x∗.
To compute the derivative of x∗ to α and β we use the function A as deﬁned in the proof of
Proposition 1. There we found that ∂










































α+β − ˆ θ
2
. (30)
Since γMS < 2π and x∗ > ˆ θ when ˆ θ < 1
2 (see the proof of the lemma), we have ∂
∂αA < 0 and
∂
∂βA > 0. The implicit function theorem gives that ∂
∂αx∗ > 0 and ∂
∂βx∗ < 0 which ﬁnishes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) This is proved in the text.
(ii) This follows from the symmetry of ˆ pR and ˆ pW and the fact that ˆ pR decreases.
(iii) The ﬁrst statement is proved in the text. The statement about ˆ pI is more complicated.
Taking βj as given, we have to show that the maximization problems for ˆ θ = 1
2 + d and for
ˆ θ = 1
2−d are identical up to a constant. From the lemma we know that x∗(1
2+d) = 1−x∗(1
2−d).
Using this and Equation (15) it follows that x∗
j(1
2 +d;βj) = 1−x∗
j(1
2 −d;βj) and x∗(1
2 +d;β) =
1 − x∗(1
2 − d;β), where we explicitly denote the dependence on ˆ θ and either βj or β.
The derivation in Equation (22) still holds when we explicitly denote the dependence of x∗
on β.
The derivation in Equation (23) shows that E1
2 − d[`|Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 −d;β),I]P1
2 − d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 −
d;β)] = P1
2 + d[Xj ≥ x∗
j(1
2 + d;βj) ∧ Xi < x∗(1
2 + d;β)]. Using the fact that P[Ac ∩ Bc] =LIQUIDITY RUNS WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION 27
1 − P[A] − P[B] + P[A ∩ B] then gives
E1
2 − d[`|Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 − d;β),I]P1
2 − d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 − d;βj)] (31)
= 1 − P1
2 + d[Xj < x∗
j(1
2 + d;βj)] − P1
2 + d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d;β)]
... + E1
2 + d[`|Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d;β),I]P1
2 + d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d;β)].
We thus ﬁnd that
E1
2 − d[v(Xi,I,β)] − E1
2 + d[v(Xi,I,β)] (32)
= −(1
2 + d) + P1
2 + d[Xi < x∗(1
2 + d;β)]
... − 1 + P1
2 + d[Xj < x∗
j(1
2 + d;βj)] + P1
2 + d[Xi ≥ x∗(1
2 + d;β)]
= −(1
2 + d) + P1
2 + d[Xj < x∗
j(1
2 + d;βj)].
This expression is independent of β which ﬁnishes the proof.